The count that was never counted
This page will make three predictions about you. Each is sealed before you can act. Two will be revealed and then refused a score. Only one has an obtainable population, a stated extraction rule, and a baseline that can lose.
Before guessing you, the machine must match them.
Bonneau, Preibusch and Anderson extracted every consecutive run of exactly four digits from the 2009 RockYou password leak. Wang and colleagues independently repeated that extraction on almost the same corpus. This browser recomputes the first percentage before any answer control unlocks.
occurrences of 1234 / four-digit runs
waiting for the check
n = 1,780,587, same extraction rule
The prediction controls are locked until this agrees.
A match with no denominator.
Kubovy and Psotka found 7 from 28.4% of 558 people on the Yale campus in 1976. That sentence is real. It is also exquisitely sensitive to the sentence used to ask it.
Ask for a number from 6 to 15 and 7 falls to 17.3% among 237 undergraduates. Mention 7 as an example and it falls to 16.6%. In 1977, changing “digit” to “one-digit number” made 1 the mode at 18.0%, while 7 fell to 12.1%. A 1979 study found no seven effect among children aged 8 and 9.
The first digit that comes to mind
Choose the first digit that comes to mind.
A chart is not a response table.
Veritasium surveyed 200,000 community-post respondents in 2024. Its video publishes a visual distribution and names 37 and 73 among the standout choices. It does not publish per-number counts or a downloadable response table.
A separate traceable 2018 chart of 6,750 responses has 69, 77 and 7 as its leading choices. Prompt, audience and platform all changed. Neither source supplies the table this page would need to reproduce a population rate for its exact prompt.
A number between 1 and 100
Locked until the digest is visible.
This one earns a score.
Two peer-reviewed papers give the same answer to two decimal places: among consecutive four-digit runs in RockYou passwords, 1234 accounts for 3.7% in Bonneau et al. and 3.72% in Wang et al.
Nick Berry's 10.713% is also correct for his different rule: select passwords that are exactly four digits long. Bonneau and Wang select every consecutive run of exactly four digits inside passwords. A percentage is partly a decision about what enters the denominator.
Choose only from the displayed decoys
Pick one displayed four-digit decoy.
That button does not record a choice of yours. It draws from crypto.getRandomValues and the result is filed as a machine draw.
The chance control, same predictor, different opponent
The exact object that predicts 1234 above plays 8,192 rounds against crypto.getRandomValues. It carries its state unchanged. With eight displayed options its baseline is 12.5%.
A 95% interval is built to miss sometimes, and this one is honest about how often. Against a true rate of exactly 12.5% over 8,192 rounds, an exact Clopper-Pearson interval excludes 12.5% computing of the time. That figure is summed from the binomial tails in this browser before you press, so a single AT CHANCE: FALSE below is the interval behaving as designed rather than a defect. Only a run of them means anything.
Ready after the prediction seal is visible.
The filename says “withcount.” The record says ranked.
SecLists ships a file a careful person might reach for next. It has 10,000 PINs in ranked order and a second column of integers. The current filename makes that column look like occurrences. The values do not behave like occurrences from any of the million-record sources above.
What the column is stays undocumented. Its values are bounded above by 255 and never rise as rank increases, so a bounded score derived from rank order fits. The mapping is not a linear squeeze of rank into a byte: the plot above runs from single rows at the top through 326 rows sharing the value 90 and back to a single row at the bottom, where a linear quantisation of 10,000 ranks onto 256 values would put about 39 rows on nearly every value. We could not find the production formula published anywhere as of 2026-08-13.
The bounded-monotone signature the detector reports is necessary, not sufficient. Press “run detector controls” and it also flags a synthetic column that really is occurrence counts, taken from a corpus small enough that most PINs were never chosen. The zero row and the share are what carry this finding; the signature only says the file is the shape a score would be.
The source file itself is not shipped here. The page carries a derived run histogram of the second column, the ten published head rows and the already published last row. It cannot reconstruct the ranked guessing list. Recorded source SHA-256: 18e0ebf05f5a9ab24dfd1d59cff979e931bc0dee8d0663008d6bd3e4b0fc320b.
What ran, what was chosen, what remains unknown.
A distribution can be shown without shipping the weapon.
Berry says he will not be “an enabler for script-kiddies” and refuses to release his source database. An earlier Wang manuscript says the researchers “avoid giving specific data” and show “aggregated statistical information.” This page follows that boundary. It shows enough to audit every claim and not enough to supply a ranked guessing list.
Nothing you type or choose leaves this browser. There is no analytics request, no remote form, no storage call and no fetch. Your three answers disappear with the tab.
Sources attached to the numbers.
Bring randomness the page cannot predict.
For the eight displayed decoys, three fair coin flips select an option uniformly. Or press “have the page draw one for me,” which uses rejection-sampled crypto.getRandomValues and files the result as a machine draw rather than as a choice of yours. Either method cuts the fixed predictor to its honest 12.5% baseline.
Do not use the resulting decoy as a real PIN. To create a real secret, use the random generator built into the system that will store it, follow that system's recovery rules, and never publish the result to this page or any other.